Newsletters: add 284 (2024-01-10) by harding · Pull Request #1457 · bitcoinops/bitcoinops.github.io

harding · 2024-01-08T09:50:22Z

Lede, releases/RCs, out-of-band topics page, topic entries @harding
Bitcoin Core PR Review Club @LarryRuane
LND 8308 @murchandamus

Also, there's a PR with some new topics originally intended for last week's newsletter at #1452

glozow · 2024-01-09T17:04:27Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+
+## News
+
+- **Discussion about proposed v3 transaction relay policy:**


I might be biased, but perhaps a more suitable title might be "Discussion about LN anchors and v3 proposal." I think a partial motivation of the post was to move out-of-scope discussion (especially the criticisms of CPFP and LN anchors in general) away from the PR, and a good amount of the summary is not v3-specific.

glozow · 2024-01-09T17:13:42Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+    over 55% of hashrate has a 99% chance of getting a transaction
+    confirmed within 6 blocks<!-- 1 - (1 - 0.55)**6 -->, likely resulting
+    in little effort being made to pay small miners of 1% or less
+    hashrate.  If small miners are paid less than large miners, mining


Perhaps:

Suggested change

hashrate. If small miners are paid less than large miners, mining

hashrate. If small miners are paid less than large miners in proportion to the blocks they find, mining

or

Suggested change

hashrate. If small miners are paid less than large miners, mining

hashrate. If smaller miners cannot profit without access to out-of-band fees, mining

Since it's expected that less hashrate => less revenue, but it's problematic when out-of-band fees are significant.

glozow · 2024-01-09T17:19:34Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+
+- **Discussion about proposed v3 transaction relay policy:**
+  Antoine Poinsot [posted][poinsot v3] to Delving Bitcoin to
+  foster`discussion about the proposals for [v3 transaction relay


Suggested change

foster`discussion about the proposals for [v3 transaction relay

foster discussion about the proposals for [v3 transaction relay

glozow · 2024-01-09T17:21:48Z

_topics/en/out-of-band-fees.md

+  - title: "Improvements to features for miners that accept out-of-band fees"
+    url: /en/newsletters/2023/05/10/#bitcoin-core-pr-review-club
+
+  - title: Discussion about the effect of out-of-band fees on proposed fee-depenndent timelocks


Suggested change

- title: Discussion about the effect of out-of-band fees on proposed fee-depenndent timelocks

- title: Discussion about the effect of out-of-band fees on proposed fee-dependent timelocks

glozow · 2024-01-09T17:23:21Z

_topics/en/out-of-band-fees.md

+
+The advantage to Alice of paying small miners out of band is minuscule,
+likely meaning they will not receive the same opportunity to earn fees
+as large miners.  If large miners are significantly more profitable than


Suggested change

as large miners. If large miners are significantly more profitable than

as large miners. If large miners are disproportionately more profitable than

?

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:33:41Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+  policy][topic v3 transaction relay] and [ephemeral anchors][topic
+  ephemeral anchors].  The thread appears to have been motivated by
+  Peter Todd [posting][todd v3] a critique of v3 relay policy on his
+  blog.  We've arbitrarily divided discussion in to several parts:


Suggested change

blog. We've arbitrarily divided discussion in to several parts:

blog. We've arbitrarily divided the discussion into several parts:

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:35:03Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+      its dependency on exogenous fees significantly incentivizes paying
+      out-of-band fees.  In particular, the unilateral close of a
+      channel with no pending payments ([HTLCs][topic htlc]) would
+      allow a large miner acceping out-of-band fees to include twice as


Suggested change

allow a large miner acceping out-of-band fees to include twice as

allow a large miner accepting out-of-band fees to include twice as

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:35:50Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+      offering a moderate discount to users paying out of band.  Peter
+      Todd calls that a threat to decentralization.
+
+      The post does suggest some uses of exogenous fees in protocols is


Suggested change

The post does suggest some uses of exogenous fees in protocols is

The post does suggest that some uses of exogenous fees in protocols is

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:36:31Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+  - **Implications of exogenous fees on safety, scalability, and costs:**
+    Peter Todd's post also noted that existing designs such as
+    [LN-Anchors][topic anchor outputs] and future designs that use
+    [ephemeral anchors][topic ephemeral anchors] require each user keep


Suggested change

[ephemeral anchors][topic ephemeral anchors] require each user keep

[ephemeral anchors][topic ephemeral anchors] require each user to keep

(or maybe "require that each user keep")

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:38:35Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+    zero-pending commitment transactions don't have any
+    timelock-dependent urgency, many honest users might choose to be
+    patient and get their transaction confirmed at the attacker's
+    expense.  The attack does also work when HTLCs are used, but it


Suggested change

expense. The attack does also work when HTLCs are used, but it

expense. The attack also works when HTLCs are used, but it

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:43:34Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+      herself.  That means she can't accept payments from Bob where he
+      spends the money he would need for the 1,000 s/vb variant.  For
+      example, a commitment transaction with 20 HTLCs would make 1
+      million sats temporarily unspendable ($450 USD at time of


Suggested change

million sats temporarily unspendable ($450 USD at time of

million sats temporarily unspendable ($450 USD at the time of

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:45:30Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+  implementation][poc lns] he made of the [LN-Symmetry][topic eltoo]
+  protocol (originally called _eltoo_) using a software fork of Core
+  Lightning.  LN-Symmetry provides bi-directional payment channels that
+  guarantee being able to publish the latest channel state onchain


Suggested change

guarantee being able to publish the latest channel state onchain

guarantee the ability to publish the latest channel state onchain

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:47:00Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+
+- [LND #8308][] raises the `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` from 9 to 18 as
+  recommended by BOLT 02 for terminal payments. This value affects external
+  invoices that not supply the `min_final_cltv_expiry` parameter. The change


Suggested change

invoices that not supply the `min_final_cltv_expiry` parameter. The change

invoices that do not supply the `min_final_cltv_expiry` parameter. The change

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:51:33Z

_topics/en/out-of-band-fees.md

+[CPFP][topic cpfp] fee bumping.  Instead, she contacts a miner directly
+and pays them to include the transaction in their candidate blocks,
+which will eventually lead to confirmation (unless the miner gives up).
+Alice's payment can be completely independent from her transaction; she


Suggested change

Alice's payment can be completely independent from her transaction; she

Alice's payment can be completely independent of her transaction; she

LarryRuane · 2024-01-09T21:53:27Z

_topics/en/out-of-band-fees.md

+as large miners.  If large miners are significantly more profitable than
+small miners for a long period of time, we would expect large miners to
+control a majority of total network hash rate.  The fewer entities
+control a majority of hash rate, the fewer entities there are that need


Suggested change

control a majority of hash rate, the fewer entities there are that need

that control a majority of hash rate, the fewer entities there are that need

harding · 2024-01-10T00:02:15Z

_posts/en/newsletters/2024-01-10-newsletter.md

+      soft fork, a hard fork, or neither? Why?"
+  a8="It's not a consensus change, it's just a network acceptance
+      policy change. Even though block timestamp acceptance is
+      not part of consensus, it's [essential][se timestamp accecptance]


@LarryRuane

I think "block timestamp acceptance" is general enough a concept to include MTP, and MTP is clearly part of consensus. Maybe this could be phrased a bit differently to clarify that there can be no consensus rule that includes data from outside the block chain, such as data from each user's own clock.

Excellent point, pushed a fixup commit (1700347). Let me know if it could be improved further, thanks.

glozow reviewed Jan 9, 2024

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LarryRuane reviewed Jan 9, 2024

View reviewed changes

harding commented Jan 10, 2024

View reviewed changes

harding and others added 4 commits January 10, 2024 06:31

Topics: add out-of-band fees

3e1c466

Newsletters: add 284 (2024-01-10)

5a0913e

News284: Describe LND8308

87ff665

News284: Add review club n28956 (Nuke adjusted time)

365eb1a

bitschmidty force-pushed the 2024-01-10-newsletter branch from 1700347 to 365eb1a Compare January 10, 2024 11:34

bitschmidty merged commit 58db0a5 into bitcoinops:master Jan 10, 2024


		## News

		- Discussion about proposed v3 transaction relay policy:

	hashrate. If small miners are paid less than large miners, mining
	hashrate. If small miners are paid less than large miners in proportion to the blocks they find, mining

	hashrate. If small miners are paid less than large miners, mining
	hashrate. If smaller miners cannot profit without access to out-of-band fees, mining

	foster`discussion about the proposals for [v3 transaction relay
	foster discussion about the proposals for [v3 transaction relay

	- title: Discussion about the effect of out-of-band fees on proposed fee-depenndent timelocks
	- title: Discussion about the effect of out-of-band fees on proposed fee-dependent timelocks

	as large miners. If large miners are significantly more profitable than
	as large miners. If large miners are disproportionately more profitable than

	blog. We've arbitrarily divided discussion in to several parts:
	blog. We've arbitrarily divided the discussion into several parts:

	allow a large miner acceping out-of-band fees to include twice as
	allow a large miner accepting out-of-band fees to include twice as

	The post does suggest some uses of exogenous fees in protocols is
	The post does suggest that some uses of exogenous fees in protocols is

	[ephemeral anchors][topic ephemeral anchors] require each user keep
	[ephemeral anchors][topic ephemeral anchors] require each user to keep

	expense. The attack does also work when HTLCs are used, but it
	expense. The attack also works when HTLCs are used, but it

	million sats temporarily unspendable ($450 USD at time of
	million sats temporarily unspendable ($450 USD at the time of

	guarantee being able to publish the latest channel state onchain
	guarantee the ability to publish the latest channel state onchain

	invoices that not supply the `min_final_cltv_expiry` parameter. The change
	invoices that do not supply the `min_final_cltv_expiry` parameter. The change

	Alice's payment can be completely independent from her transaction; she
	Alice's payment can be completely independent of her transaction; she

	control a majority of hash rate, the fewer entities there are that need
	that control a majority of hash rate, the fewer entities there are that need

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harding commented Jan 8, 2024 •

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